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The patterns and mechanisms of collective decision making in hu-
mans and animals have attracted both empirical and theoretical at-
tention. Of particular interest has been the variety of social feed-
back rules, and the extent to which these behavioural rules can be
explained and predicted from theories of rational estimation and de-
cision making. However, models that aim to model the full range of
social information use have incorporated ad hoc departures from ra-
tional decision-making theory to explain the apparent stochasticity
and variability of behaviour. In this paper I develop a model of so-
cial information use and collective decision making by fully rational
agents that reveals how a wide range of apparently stochastic social
decision rules emerge from fundamental information asymmetries
both between individuals, and between the decision makers and the
observer of those decisions. As well as showing that rational deci-
sion making is consistent with empirical observations of collective
behaviour, this model makes several testable predictions about how
individuals make decisions in groups, and offers a valuable perspec-
tive on how we view sources of variability in animal, and human, be-
haviour.
collective behaviour | rational choice | social information
Collective decision making is a ubiquitous task for socialanimal species, including humans (1). Whether decid-
ing where to forage, which nest site to choose or when to
move, individual decisions are greatly informed by observing
the choices that others make. As recently as 2008, Ward
et al. (2) were able to state that ‘little is known about the
mechanisms underlying decision-making in vertebrate animal
groups’. Since then, however, a large literature has explored
the rules governing social information use in collective de-
cisions across various taxa, for example in insects (3), fish
(2, 4), birds (5, 6) and mammals (7, 8), including primates
(9) and humans (10, 11). What links decision making in all
of these groups is the presence of social reinforcement, with
individuals demonstrating a strong preference for an option
chosen by others, which increases with the number of others
who have selected it. This reinforcement can be expressed
as a social response function – the probability of selecting a
given option conditioned on the number of other individuals
that have previously chosen it. A large degree of variation
has been observed in these social response functions, ranging
from linear relationships (e.g. (3, 12)), to strongly non-linear
‘quorum’ rules (13), where the apparent attractiveness of an
option appears to increase exponentially with the number
of individuals choosing it, before saturating as this number
passes a ‘quorum’ level. In addition to variation between taxa,
studies have also highlighted how the same species can exhibit
different patterns of collective behaviour under different lab-
oratory or field conditions (14–17) highlighting the potential
importance of context-dependent social responses.
Complementing these empirical studies, mathematical the-
ories have been developed to explain why these social decision
rules take the form observed. For example, Easley and Klein-
berg (18) proposed a toy model for understanding collective
decision making in a group of rational agents. This model, il-
lustrated by the example of an individual selecting a restaurant
to eat at, demonstrated how easily an unbreakable consensus
decision could emerge, once the cumulative social information
provided by past choices outweighs any new quality signal
that an uncommitted individual might receive. More recent
work has attempted to build a fully descriptive model of such
collective decision making by considering the purportedly ra-
tional beliefs and decisions of agents exposed to the social
information provided by choices of others (19, 20), and the
studies have been successful in reproducing the observed re-
sponse functions in a variety of taxa including insects (20), fish
(19–21) and birds (5, 6). Recent extensions of these models
have also considered how social responses might vary as a
result of changes in environmental context (22).
However, while these models have had success in reproduc-
ing the observed features of collective decisions, this has been
at the cost of internal consistency as theories of rational be-
haviour. An agent’s decision involves two components: (i) an
estimation stage, where the focal agent forms beliefs about the
quality of its options, and (ii) a decision rule, which specifies
how the agent acts based on those beliefs. In the first stage
the models present a broadly coherent theory of estimation
based on Bayesian updating. However, beliefs are restricted
to statements about whether options are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (or
‘best’ (19)). This binary categorisation does not fully capture
the range of possibilities that individuals face in expected-
utility maximising, rational behaviour (23). Choices made
under uncertainty are characterised by risk-reward trade-offs,
and it is not clear how these can be translated into a simple
‘good’ or ‘bad’ dichotomy, or how decisions should be made
on the basis of such a classification. The second stage of
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these models, the decision rule, introduces further departures
from rationality. Here agents are assumed to select options
probabilistically based on the results of the estimation stage.
Such non-deterministic behaviour is inconsistent with the idea
of individuals as rational agents. This problem emerges as a
result of a confusion regarding the sources of observational
uncertainty in empirical studies. Because the decisions made
are typically not predictable with certainty by an observer or
experimenter, they are themselves deemed to be stochastic.
Instead, this uncertainty can be understood by incorporating
the viewpoint of the observer into the theory. The observer
makes measurements of the physical and social environment
that only imperfectly capture the information observed by the
focal decision maker (or not observed, for example in the case
of visual occlusion). From this one can recognise that the
inability of the observer to predict individuals’ decisions arises
from the limited access they have to the information driving
those actions, not from fundamentally stochastic behaviour
by the agents themselves.
Why should we be concerned about departures from ratio-
nality in these models? Given established critiques of rational-
agent models (24, 25), should we not be more concerned about
whether these models are consistent with empirical measure-
ments? To this objection there are two responses. The first
is that rational-agent models provide a baseline from which
to measure departures from rationality. These departures are
interesting because they indicate either where an evolutionary
process has been unable to produce an optimal solution, or
where other factors, such as cognitive cost, have produced
a trade-off. Such departures can only be detected if we un-
derstand what genuinely rational behaviour looks like. The
second response concerns the purported goals of previous work.
One can find a reasonable empirical match to any observed
social response by choosing an appropriate parametrisation
of a sufficiently flexible mathematical function. It has been
the explicit goal of theoretical work in this area (19, 20) to
understand how these responses emerge from logical consid-
eration of the individuals’ own estimations and actions as
rational decision makers. My goal here is to fully explore the
consequences of the rationality assumption to show where data
can (and cannot) be explained by this fundamental principle.
This paper develops a model of collective decision making
by identical, rational agents, based on three fundamental prin-
ciples: (i) individuals behave as expected-utility maximising
agents, based on their own beliefs about the world; (ii) each
individual’s beliefs are generated from the public and private
information that they have access to, using Bayesian proba-
bility updating; and (iii) empirical observation of individuals’
actions is undertaken by an observer who has their own private
information as well as the public social information on which
to base predictions and interpretations of individual behaviour.
The resulting model reproduces the key successful aspects of
previous research, while making additional, testable predic-
tions about social information use that are not accounted for
in existing theory.
Theory
Consider the classic paradigm of a group faced with a se-
quential, binary decision. That is, a sequence of n identical
individuals choose between option A and option B, and can
see the choices made by those ahead of them. Such a con-
text is well approximated empirically by, for example, Y-maze
experiments (e.g. (2, 26)) where individuals are asked to
choose between two competing arms of a maze. I develop a
mathematical framework for calculating the optimal choice for
each individual, based on private information that they alone
observe, and public information constituted by the observable
choices made by others. I also derive mathematical expres-
sions for the probability that an outside observer (such as an
experimental scientist) will observe an individual making a
particular choice, conditioned on what that observer can know
about the system and the focal individual. As noted above,
incorporating the observer explicitly is key to understanding
the source of observational uncertainty in a fundamentally
deterministic model.
Rational choice. I start from the assumption that each of the
two options each has a true utility, UA for option A and
UB for option B. These utilities may also be understood as
fitness consequences of the decision in terms of evolutionary
adaptation (27). Since the individuals are assumed to be
identical, these utilities are the same for all. These true utilities
are unknown, but each individual, i ∈ 1, . . . , n, can estimate
the utility of each choice based on the specific information,
Ii that they possess. Following the rules of Bayesian-rational
decision making (23), I assert that individual i will choose
option A if and only if the expected utility of A is greater than
that of B, according to i’s estimation. Let x = UA − UB be
the true difference in utilities, then:
P (i→ A | Ii) =
{
1, if
∫
∞
−∞
xp(x | Ii)dx > 0
0, otherwise
[1]
where p(x | Ii) is a probability density representing individual
i’s personal belief about x.
Private and public information. What information does indi-
vidual i have? I assume that Ii is composed of two parts,
private and public. First, there is direct sensory information
that i can perceive from the two options. For example, a forag-
ing individual may perceive differing food odours from A and
B, or a prey animal may see differing patterns of shadows that
suggest one choice is more likely to lead to a predator. This is
the individual’s private information. Secondly, if i > 1, then
individual i can see the choices made by any other individual
j, where j < i. This is public information – it is available to
all individuals who still wait to make their choice. In common
with previous work (19, 20) I make the important assump-
tion that the choices of others provide information about the
relative utilities of A and B, but do not influence the true
values of these utilities. That is, an option does not become
good simply because others have chosen it. In making this
assumption I exclude phenomena such as predation-dilution
effects (28), where the presence of conspecifics is itself desir-
able, or foraging competition (29), where the presence of other
individuals lowers the utility of a given option.
Prior belief. Before an individual receives any information re-
garding the utility difference, x, I assume that they have no
reason to favour option A or B (any such reason should count
as private information). I ascribe to them a prior belief regard-
ing the values that x may take, and by symmetry centre this
on zero. I further assume that by environmental habituation
2 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Mann
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(either genetic or experience) they have an intrinsic idea of the
scale of possible utility differences between competing choices.
In this paper I will assume that prior beliefs follow a normal
distribution, and without loss of generality we can measure
utilities in units that set this variance of this distribution to
one:
p(x) =
1√
2pi
exp(−x2) = φ(x). [2]
Hereafter I use φ(x) to refer to the standard normal distribu-
tion density function. Throughout this paper I will assume
that information and expectations about the environment are
normally distributed. This assumption is likely to hold well
for low-level sensory information such as detecting food or
predators, but may be less appropriate for more cognitively
advanced tasks. The model development detailed here can be
followed for any alternative distribution of interest.
Private information. Individual i has access to private informa-
tion that gives a noisy estimate of x. This may be via visual,
olfactory or other sensory stimuli, but here I model this as an
abstract quantity, ∆i, that is generated stochastically by the
environment based on the real utility difference x, and a noise
variance ν2 due to both the latent sources of environmental
noise (e.g. air currents disrupting olfactory gradients) and lim-
itations of an individual’s sensory apparatus. Mathematically,
∆i is normally distributed with mean x and variance ν
2:
p(∆i | x) = φ((∆i − x)/ν) [3]
Individual i revises their belief about x in the light of their
private information using Bayes’ rule:
p(x | ∆i) ∝ p(∆i | x)p(x)
∝ φ((∆i − x)/ν)φ(x)
[4]
Consider the case of the first decision maker, i = 1. This indi-
vidual has no public, social information to draw on, and bases
their estimate of x entirely on their private information, ∆1.
For the purposes of making a rational decision, the important
quantity for them to evaluate is the sign of the expected utility
difference, E(x | ∆1):
E(x | ∆1) =
∫
∞
−∞
xp(x | ∆i)dx
∝
∫
∞
−∞
xφ((∆1 − x)/ν)φ(x)dx
[5]
It is clear that E(x | ∆1) > 0 iff ∆1 > 0, and therefore that
the sign of individual 1’s private information dictates which
option it will choose.
Social information. Having determined that the first decision
maker uses the sign of their private information to make their
choice, I now consider the case of the second and subsequent
decision makers. Individual 2 begins its estimation of x in the
same manner as individual 1, by updating its original prior
belief (which is identical for all agents), using its own private
information, ∆2:
p(x | ∆2) ∝ φ((∆2 − x)/ν)φ(x) [6]
What information does the choice of individual 1 provide to
individual 2? Since the choice of individual 1 does not change
the true utilities of the options, its choice can only influence
the estimation of individual 2 by giving information about the
private information that individual 1 received. If individual
1 were to communicate its private information directly to
individual 2, then the second individual could update its belief
based on this new data. However, imagine that individual 1
has chosen option A. Individual 2 does not know what private
information individual 1 has received, but can only infer from
the observed resulting choice that ∆1 > 0. Therefore it must
consider all possible values of the ∆1 that the first individual
may have observed, weighted by probability, and adjust its
belief accordingly. Let C1 = 1 indicate that individual 1 chose
option A (and conversely C1 = −1 for option B), then:
p(x | C1 = 1,∆2) ∝ p(x | ∆2)P (C1 = 1 | x)
∝ p(x | ∆2)P (∆1 > 0 | x)
∝ φ((∆2 − x)/ν)Φ(x/ν)φ(x)
[7]
where Φ(z) =
∫ z
−∞
φ(t)dt is the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the standard normal distribution. Similarly, if indi-
vidual 1 had chosen B, then individual 2 would make the
estimation:
p(x | C1 = −1,∆2) ∝ φ((∆2 − x)/ν)Φ(−x/ν)φ(x) [8]
The decision of individual 2 is now governed by their ex-
pected value of x. Define ∆∗2 such that:
E(x | C1,∆∗2) = 0
⇒
∫
∞
−∞
xφ((∆∗2 − x)/ν)Φ(C1x/ν)φ(x)dx = 0
[9]
Individual 2 will now choose option A iff ∆2 > ∆
∗
2, implying
that E(x | C1,∆2) > 0.
Subsequent decisions. To complete our view of how social
information is used we need to consider the viewpoint of the
third individual (assuming n > 2). This individual must
consider not only the decisions made by individuals 1 and
2 in conjunction with its own private information, but also
the order in which these decisions were made. As with all
individuals, I begin by updating the universal prior, using
individual 3’s private information:
p(x | ∆3) ∝ φ((∆3 − x)/ν)φ(x) [10]
Individual 3 can also update its belief based on the choice of
individual 1, in exactly the same manner as individual 2:
p(x | C1,∆3) ∝ φ((∆3 − x)/ν)Φ(C1x/ν)φ(x). [11]
Now individual 3 needs to update its belief based on the
decision made by individual 2, C2:
p(x | C1, C2,∆3) ∝ P (C2 | x,C1)p(x | C1,∆3) [12]
In order to evaluate the first term on the right hand side,
individual 3 needs to adopt the viewpoint of individual 2
and calculate the critical value ∆∗2 based on C1. Then, from
individual 3’s perspective, the the probability of choice C2 is:
P (C2 = 1 | x,C1) = P (∆2 > ∆∗2 | x)
= Φ((x−∆∗2)/ν).
[13]
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Similarly, P (C2 = −1 | x,C1) = Φ(−(x − ∆∗2)/ν). Hence,
individual updates its belief based on C2 to:
p(x | C1, C2,∆3) ∝ φ((∆3 − x)/ν)Φ(C1x/ν)
×Φ(C2(x−∆∗2)/ν)φ(x)
[14]
As with individual 2, we can thus evaluate a critical value, ∆∗3,
defined by:∫
∞
−∞
xφ((∆∗3 − x)/ν)Φ(C1x/ν)Φ(C2(x−∆∗2)/ν)φ(x)dx = 0.
[15]
Individual 3 will now choose option A iff ∆3 > ∆
∗
3. By
iteratively proceeding in similar fashion we can determine the
belief of individual i, based on its private information and the
observed choices of previous individuals, C1, . . . , Ci−1:
p(x | C1, . . . , Ci−1,∆i) ∝φ((∆i − x)/ν)φ(x)
×
i−1∏
j=1
Φ(Cj(x−∆∗j )/ν),
[16]
and ∫
∞
−∞
xp(x | C1, . . . , Cj−1∆∗j )dx = 0, [17]
and I define ∆∗1 = 0.
Observation. So far I have discussed how each individual uses
private and public information to make a rational, expected-
utility maximising decision. Now I consider the perspective
as an observer of this process. As an observer, one is able to
observe the same public, social information available to the in-
dividuals themselves – the sequence of decisions. However, the
observer’s viewpoint differs in two ways. First, they have no
access to the private information of any individual. Secondly,
they may have knowledge about the true environmental con-
ditions. For example, they may have designed an experiment
such that x = UA − UB = 0, e.g. a Y-maze with symmetrical
arms. Furthermore, especially in a laboratory setting, they
may have altered the environment, such that noise levels differ
from those that the individuals are habituated to.
Assume that true values of x and ν2, and also the noise
variance of the experimental environment, η2 are known. How
can we calculate the probability that a individual i will make
a specific choice? First, we can follow the calculations above
for that individual, to determine the critical value ∆∗i , based
on the observed previous decisions. We can then evaluate the
probability, conditioned on the known x and η2, that individual
i’s private information will exceed this value:
P (Ci = 1 | x, η, C1, . . . Ci−1) = P (∆i > ∆∗i | x, η)
= Φ((x−∆∗i )/η).
[18]
Although this equation provides the probability that the ob-
served decision will be a particular option, it implies no non-
deterministic behaviour; the uncertainty encoded by the prob-
ability is purely a consequence of the observer not sharing the
same information as the focal decision maker. Note that the
information provided by C1, . . . Ci−1 is encoded in the calcu-
lated value of ∆∗i . Since each critical value depends iteratively
on those before, this is determined by the order of decisions
made, as well as the aggregate numbers choosing A and B.
Unordered social information. Observers not only have differ-
ing information from the individuals under observation, they
also make choices about how to measure and record behaviour.
As an example of this: the majority of previous studies have
largely ignored the precise order of previous decisions made
when measuring social responses. For comparison with this
previous work, we can consider what we, the observer, would
predict about the decision of individual i, conditioned on
knowing only the number of previous individuals choosing
A (nA) and B (nB). This requires us to consider the set of
all possible sequences, C that obey result in nA, nB, and to
sum over the probability that each of these is the sequence
to led to the current arrangement. This summation, com-
bined with the decision rule for each specific sequence derived
above, then gives the probability that next choice will be either
A or B, conditioned on this unordered observation of social
information.
P (Ci | nA, nB , x, η) =
∑
C
P (Ci | x, η, C1, . . . Ci−1)
× P (C1, . . . Ci−1 | x, η)
[19]
Note, this calculation assumes that the individuals themselves
are aware of the order in which decisions were made, but that
the observer has been unable to record these or has chosen
not to do so.
Conflicting information. Several experimental studies have in-
vestigated scenarios where a conflict is introduced between an
individual’s private and social information, in order to identify
the relative strengths of the two factors. For example, in such
an experiment each individual may be trained in advance to
associate food with one of two or more different colour or
pattern. Individuals with different trained associations are
then placed in a group and presented with a decision where
each option has a colour or pattern signal (see e.g. (30)).
This scenario can be simulated by giving each agent pri-
vate information drawn from a mixture of two conflicting
distributions:
p(∆i | x) = 1
2
[φ((∆i − z/2)/η) + φ((∆i + z/2)/η)] , [20]
where z is the magnitude of the conflict in information, and η
is again the experimental noise level. These two parameters
indicate respectively how strong the training has indicated
the utility difference is (e.g. the amount or quality of food
provided), and the reliability of the signal (e.g. whether the
food was always provided in the same quantities). With each
individual’s private information drawn from this mixture dis-
tribution, a simulation of the group’s aggregate behaviour can
follow as above. It should be noted here I am still assum-
ing that the individual decision makers have identical utility
functions; the conflict between them is solely on the level of
the information they have received, and not one of differing
preferences.
Results
In this section I consider a variety of possible experimental
and field study scenarios that illustrate the key predictions of
the model.
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Fig. 1. Consistency of predicted decisions across environmental noise/signal ratios,
for a range of possible observed past decision sequence. Each line is labelled with
the corresponding sequence of past decisions, from left to right. The black line
shows cases with one previous decision maker, blue lines two and red lines three
respectively.
Role of environmental signal to noise ratio. I begin by consid-
ering an experimental field study in the habitual environment
of the decision makers. In this case the decision maker’s pre-
vious experience gives them reliable prior information about
typical signal and noise levels in their environment, while
the observer can experimentally control the true utilities of
possible choices. I analysed the expected behaviour when
the decision makers are confronted with a symmetrical binary
choice in which the true utility difference is zero: UA−UB = 0.
I calculated the probability that the next decision maker would
choose option A, conditioned on different previous decision
sequences, and for a range of environmental noise/signal ratios.
This analysis, illustrated in Figure 1 shows that environmental
noise levels have little effect on the predicted choice proba-
bilities, displaying only a slightly inflection at a ratio of one.
This result can be understood intuitively by noting that higher
ambient noise levels reduce the reliability of both private and
public information – the decision maker should trust its own
information less, since it may result from noise,but should also
recognise that the decisions of others are also more likely to
be incorrect. These two effects almost perfectly balance in
this analysis for a wide range of possible noise/signal ratios.
Since the environmental noise/signal ratio has little effect on
behaviour, I set it to a value of ν = 1 henceforth for simplicity.
Observed social interaction rules. My model gives the proba-
bility that a focal individual will make a given choice condi-
tioned on any ordered sequence of previous decisions. However,
in practice researchers are often either unable to observe this
precise sequence, or choose to ignore the details of the order
in which decisions were made, focusing instead only on the
number of individuals who have previously chosen A or B
in aggregate. To make comparisons between the theory de-
veloped here and previous work, I therefore calculated the
expected observations on this aggregated level by considering
all possible sequences of previous choices that could have led
to an aggregate state nA, nB (see equation 19). To illustrate
the predicted observations a researcher would make in such
an experiment, we consider two hypothetical experiments,
each with ten individuals and in which the ambient noise
level matches that of the habitual environment. The first
experiment uses symmetric options (x = UA − UB = 0) The
predicted observations made in these experiments are shown in
Figure 2. Panel A shows the probability that a focal decision
maker will choose option A, conditioned on known nA and
nB . Contour lines of equal probability show a radial pattern
that is suggestive of Weber’s Law of relative differences (31).
To illustrate this further, panel B shows how the probability
of choosing option A varies with the relative proportion of
previous decisions: (nA)/(nA + nB). We see that the results
averaged over all possible sequences (red points) show a very
close linear trend. However, this apparently simple relation-
ship results from the weighted average of sequence-specific
probabilities, shown with black points, where larger points
indicate more probable sequences. Evaluating the probabil-
ity of generating each possible sequence of decisions, we can
determine the probability for the final value of nA after all
decisions have been made (panel C). This exhibits the classic
U-shaped distribution that is characteristic of observations in
many collective decision-making studies (e.g (13)). At first
glance this result conflicts with the pattern in panel B – a
sequence of decisions made according to Weber’s Law would be
expected to results in a uniform distribution equal probabilites
for final values of nA (see (32)). This apparent contradiction is
resolved by noting that the linear relationship in panel B does
not hold as a decision rule in its own right, but only as the
average behaviour aggregated over many possible sequences of
decisions using the true behavioural rules shown in equations
16 and 17. This highlights how apparently straightforward
analysis of empirical data may lead to erroneous conclusions
about underlying behavioural mechanisms.
In addition to a symmetric experimental setup, I also con-
sider a hypothetical experiment in which one option is objec-
tively better than the other, for example through the presence
of food (e.g. (33)), or the absence of a predator (e.g. (26)).
In this example I assume that option A is better, and set
x = UA−UB =
√
2/pi. This value is equivalent to the average
absolute difference in utilities in the habitual environment, and
thus represents a ‘typical’ decision for the agents to make. I
made predictions of the observed decisions made by ten agents
as in the symmetric case, the results of which are shown in
Figure 2 D-F. In this case we see that, as expected, decisions
systematically favour the higher utility option. As above, the
decisions observed as a function of nA and nB hide a broader
variety of social contexts defined by the ordering of decisions
(panel E).
Context specificity. The hypothetical experiment above was
assumed to take place in an environment where noise levels
were the same as the decision makers’ habitual experience. I
showed that this habitual noise level did not in itself have a
strong influence on predicted decisions – individuals habituated
to noisy environments should be no more or less likely follow
one another in their own environment than those from less
noisy habitats. But what if individuals are removed from their
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Fig. 2. Results of a two hypothetical studies of collective decision making. Panels A-C show predicted observations made from a symmetric experimental setup (x = 0), while
panels D-F show those predicted from an experiment in which option A is superior by an amount typical in the habitual environment (x =
√
2/pi): (A, D) the probability,
from the perspective of an external observer, that a focal agent will choose option A, conditioned on the number of agents, nA, nB , previously choosing options A and B
respectively; (B, E) the probability of the focal agent selecting option A against the proportion of previous agents selecting A; red points indicate the average across all possible
sequences of previous choices, while black points indicate probabilities conditioned on specific sequences (discretised to intervals of 0.05), with larger points indicating more
likely sequences. The average trend shows the relationship that would be observed in an experiment where sequence information was discarded; (C, F) the probability of
possible aggregate outcomes, defined as the number of agents in total that will select option A, showing the high probability of consensus decisions, and of collectively choosing
the higher-utility option in the asymmetric scenario.
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own habitat and placed in an unfamiliar environment? As
an example, consider collecting fish which usually shoal in
somewhat murky and strongly odoured rivers or lakes, and
placing these in clear water in a uniform, plastic experimental
arena (e.g (13, 26, 34–36) and many others). What impact
might this change have on their behaviour? One possibility
is that a severe change of environment may lead to erratic or
pathological behaviour as a result of distress or disorientation,
which I do not account for here. Another possibility is that the
fish continue to follow social interaction rules that have evolved
to be near-optimal in their own habitat, without accounting
for the changed context.
In the relatively sterile laboratory conditions, the ambient
levels of noise such as stray odours may be far lower than in the
wild. In combination with a symmetrical experimental setup
as above (UA = UB), this means that an individual is less
likely to observe private information of a sufficient magnitude
to contradict the apparent social information provided by its
conspecifics, and will therefore be more inclined to aggregate
with and follow these other individuals than it would in the
wild. Conversely, a strongly-lit laboratory environment may
introduce a greater intensity of visual noise simply by virtue of
the greater overall intensity of visual stimulation. I explicitly
calculate the effect that experimental noise has using equation
18, varying the ratio between experimental and habitual noise
levels. That is, I assume that the agents continue to act
rationally in the belief that noise levels remain at those their
habitual environment, while in fact the noise levels depart
from this baseline. As shown in Figure 3, I find as expected
that lower experimental noise levels increase the tendency
to follow the majority (panels A, B), resulting in a greater
aggregate consensus (panels E, F). Higher noise levels reduce
the weight of social information (panels C, D) and thus prevent
consensus from emerging (panel G, H). Conversely this means
that for a given experimental noise level, individuals from
noisier habitual environments are expected to aggregate more
strongly and behave more socially than those from habitats
with less noise.
Dynamic social information. As noted previously, the predic-
tions my model makes about the decision a focal individual
will make, conditioned on the available public information, de-
pends strongly on the precise order in which previous decisions
were made. To investigate this further, I now focus on the
relative importance of the most recent decision in particular.
Using equations 16, 17 and 18, I calculated the probability, in
a symmetric experimental setup, that a focal individual will
choose option A, conditioned on previous sequences of deci-
sions of the form C = {−1,−1, . . . , 1}. That is, sequences in
which the most recent previous decision was option A, after a
series of individuals choosing B. In most models such sequences
– with many individuals choosing B and only one choosing A
– would result in a high probability that the focal individual
would choose B, following the majority. By contrast, as shown
in figure 4, I predict that the focal individual is most likely to
choose A, regardless of the weight of the majority for B. While
longer series of earlier choices for B do make the probability
to select A somewhat lower, this nonetheless always remains
above 0.5. This result might initially appear counter-intuitive:
why should the social information provided by a large major-
ity of other individuals be outweighed by one recent decision?
However, this neatly illustrates the consequences of taking
seriously the idea of identical, rational agents. The focal in-
dividual, observing the most recent decision, must conclude
that the individual making that decision has observed private
information which is sufficient to outweigh all the previous
public social information. The focal individual cannot observe
this private information directly, but since the agents are iden-
tical it can infer that had it seen this information itself, it
would have made the same decision. Therefore it must con-
clude, prior to observing its own private information, that the
available public information is now in favour of A. Since, in a
symmetric implementation of the model with UA = UB, the
focal individual’s private information is equally likely to favour
either choice, the observational prediction is that the most
recent decision will be followed on the majority of occasions,
regardless of the overall number of previous choices made for
either option.
Conflicting information. I considered a scenario of 10 individ-
uals that receive conflicting private information according to
equation 20. I evaluated the probability of each possible aggre-
gate outcome at each of twenty different magnitudes of conflict
between z = 0 and z = 10, and five different experimental
noise levels of η = 1/3, 2/3, 1, 3/2 and 3. The results, shown in
Figure 5, show the degree of group consensus for each scenario,
between zero (individuals split between two options equally)
and one (all individuals choosing the same option). As already
shown above, consensus is not guaranteed even when conflict is
zero, and noisier experimental setups tend to reduce consensus.
Increasing the magnitude of conflict decreases the expected
degree of consensus. With sufficient conflict consensus breaks
down entirely and each individual simply follows its own pri-
vate information, leading to consensus values in line with those
expected from a binomial distribution (dashed line). For high
noise conditions the decline of consensus is gradual from an
initially low value, whereas in low noise conditions there is
a clearer transition from consensus to independent decision
making. When training information is highly reliable com-
pared to that found in the habitual environment (η = 1/3) this
transition is very sharp, and the intermediate range between
full consensus and completely independent decisions is very
narrow.
Discussion
I have developed a model of collective animal decision making
based on perfectly rational individual decisions by identical
individuals in the context of private and public information.
Using this model I have explored the consequences of rational
decision making, from the perspective of an observer who
also has only partial information about individuals under
observation. The results shown here demonstrate fundamental
similarities both to earlier models of collective decision making,
and to the key features of observed behaviour across a variety
of taxa (20).
Formulating this model focused attention on the under-
appreciated role of the observer and experimental context
in understanding why animals under study make particular
observed choices. Specifically, I have shown that even when
agents themselves are purely rational (and therefore act deter-
ministically on their own information), their actions appear
random to the observer as a result of the agents’ private infor-
mation. Furthermore, the observer potentially influences both
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Fig. 3. The effect of varying the experimental noise level. Panels A-D show the social response function for hypothetical experiments with noise levels in the ratios
η = 1/3, 2/3, 3/2 and 3 relative to the habitual environment. As in Figure 2, red points indicate the average observed response, while black points indicate specific sequences
of past decisions, with size indicating the relative probability of each sequence. Panels E-H show the corresponding proportions of aggregate outcomes for each experimental
noise level. Social response and aggregate cohesion is stronger in experiments with noise levels lower than the habitual environment (η < 1), and correspondingly weaker in
experiments with greater noise levels (η > 1).
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Fig. 4. Predicted probability for a focal individual to choose option A, conditioned
a sequence of past decisions of the form: B,. . . , B,A, evaluated for a range of
experimental to habitual noise ratios (η). In all cases the probability to choose A
remains above 0.5, regardless of the size of the majority choosing B.
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Fig. 5. The average degree of consensus (|nA  nB |/(nA + nB)) in groups
when individuals receive conflicting information, as a function of the magnitude of
information conflict and the experimental noise level (η). The dashed line shows the
expectation from a binomial distribution where each individual chooses independently
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the behaviour of the individuals under study (through their
control of experimental conditions) and the interpretation of
behaviour observed (through their choice of what to measure).
Both of these aspects of observation are under-appreciated in
the collective behaviour literature, and are potentially respon-
sible for a substantial proportion of the variance in empirical
observations. It should be noted that this perspective does not
imply that the actual process being observed is dependent on
the observer. Two different observers making measurements
of the same experiment will observe the same decisions being
made, but they may come to different conclusions depending
on what they know about the experimental setup, and what
they choose to measure.
This model predicts that the decision-making process is
context specific. To the degree that laboratory conditions
represent a lower noise environment than the wild, I antici-
pate that observed social tendencies will be more pronounced
than in the wild. In human behaviour, this offers an expla-
nation for why individuals exposed to social information in
laboratory experiments exhibit stronger effect sizes than those
exposed in more naturalistic environments (16); the laboratory
environment is subject to less spurious information that can
contradict the social information presented. A recent study
of context-dependent collective behaviour in sticklebacks also
found that these fish were more cohesive in featureless envi-
ronments than those with more distractions such as food or
plant cover. The model also offers an ecological explanation
for the differing social behaviours observed in different species
in similar contexts. For example, Aron et al. (37) found that
Argentine ants (L. humile) showed a stronger preference for
social information over private information compared to gar-
den ants (L. niger), and reflected that this may be explained
by the differing ecology of these two species: Argentine ants
are restless migrators feeding on novel food sources (a high
noise/signal environment), while garden ants are sedentary
and feed on well-established food sources (a low noise/signal
environment). In similar laboratory conditions, L. humile
therefore arguably experiences a greater reduction in noise
relative to its habitual environment, leading to a prediction of
stronger social behaviour. Similarly, Wright et al. (38) found
that wild-strain zebrafish exhibited a stronger shoaling ten-
dency than laboratory-strain specimens when both were tested
in the same laboratory environment. This was attributed to
differences in predation risk but could also reflect informational
differences in each strain’s habitual environment.
One should, therefore, be careful when interpreting differ-
ences in laboratory behaviour between species from different
environments, as this may betoken differing contrasts between
the laboratory and the wild, rather than different habitual lev-
els of sociality. With the development of increasingly advanced
tracking technology, researchers have recently re-oriented to-
wards studying animal behaviour in the wild (39–41), and to
studying human social behaviour outside of the laboratory
(42–44). This study supports this trend; collective behaviour
in the wild may vary significantly from that in the lab, and
understanding natural behaviour thus requires studying the
animals in their habitual environment. An interesting corol-
lary of this finding is that social behaviour may be expected to
change and become more apparently rational in the laboratory
over time in cognitively-plastic species such as humans, as they
habituate to the new environment. Indicative results of such
an effect in a related domain have been shown for example by
Burton-Chellew, Nax & West (45), who found that initially
‘irrational’ pro-social behaviour by players in a public goods
game become more ‘rationally’ self-serving as the game was
repeated many times under the same laboratory conditions.
Whether or not similar plasticity is seen in the laboratory use
of social information is worthy of further study.
I also investigated how context specificity affects behaviour
when individuals are given conflicting information, for example
through training prior to the experiment. I found that in labo-
ratory conditions where complete consensus decision making is
the norm (low noise relative to the habitual environment), the
reaction of individuals to conflicting information is predicted
to be strongly non-linear with respect to the magnitude of
the conflict, with a sharp transition between consensus and
independent decision making. However, this transition, which
might be observed as a critical threshold in the laboratory,
would be less clearly observed in more natural conditions
(η = 1), where the model predicts a more gradual decline in
the degree of consensus achieved as the magnitude of conflict
is increased. Again, this highlights how behaviours observed
in laboratory experiments may not be directly translatable
to wild behaviour. Furthermore, I have shown that collective
decision making with conflicting information depends on both
the magnitude and reliability of the information individuals
receive, whereas previous studies have often treated these dis-
tinct informational features ambiguously in force-based models
of collective decision making (e.g. (46, 47)).
Comparing the model predictions and experimental studies
highlighted a further important data analysis consideration.
I measured how individual decisions varied in the context of
how many others had previously chosen different options, but
without any information about the sequence of those choices.
In the symmetric case, agents exhibited an apparent social
interaction that depended linearly on the number of other
individuals choosing either option – a Weber’s law response
function. The linearity of this relationship is apparently at
odds with the strong tendency to consensus at the aggregate
level. Perna et al. noted the same apparent conflict in their ex-
perimental study of trail formation in ants (3). They proposed
that the conflict could be resolved through the introduction of
stochastic noise in the decision-making process. In contrast,
I have shown that this conflict can be be resolved within a
rational model by focusing on the importance of ordering in
the sequence of previous decisions. The sequence of decisions
has often been ignored in previous work or relegated to ad-
ditional material not central to the study’s key insights; this
model forces us to recognise the central place that ordering
has in understanding rational social behaviour. As shown
by Perna, Gregoire & Mann (48), inferred social responses
depend intimately on how social context and behaviour are
measured. The results shown here should reiterate that so-
called ‘model-free’ data-driven analysis (49) is an illusion –
even when no model is specified, it is implicit in the choices
made by researchers regarding what to measure.
Looking more closely at the effect of ordering also revealed
testable predictions about the use of social information for
which few existing data are available. Specifically, the model
predicts that social information associated with the most recent
decision makers should have an overwhelming impact on the
focal agent. Excluding their own private information, a focal
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agent should always conclude that the total social information
favours the most recent decision made, precisely because they
must believe that, as identical rational agents, they would have
made the same decision given the same information. From an
observational perspective this means that we should expect to
see the most recent decision being more predictive of the next
decision than the aggregate numbers of previous choices. To
the best of my knowledge no experiment has previously tested
this specific hypothesis. However, some suggestive evidence
of such an effect has been seen in at least one previous study
(50), where decisions by humbug damselfish to switch between
two coral regions were best predicted by the most recent
movement of a conspecific. Preferential following of recent
decision makers may also help to explain the sensitivity of
groups to changes of movement by relatively few initiators and
the corresponding prevalence of ‘false alarms’ in groups of prey
animals (51). However, reliably inferring such a behavioural
rule from observational data is difficult – potentially unknown
information driving the most recent decision maker’s choice
may also be influencing the focal individual. The prediction
that the most recent decisions provide the most salient social
information could be tested experimentally by inducing a
conflict between the most-recently observable decision and the
majority of previous decisions, for example through the use of
artificial substitute conspecifics (e.g. (52, 53)).
A model of rational behaviour should not be mistaken for
a detailed understanding of biological cognition: behaviour
results from biological processes that are subject to evolution-
ary pressure and physical constraints, and understanding the
these biological mechanisms will be important in gaining fur-
ther understanding of how animals cognitively represent and
process social information (54). Real-world animal species, in-
cluding humans, only approximate perfect rationality (24, 55)
and typically only in contexts in which adaptation has taken
place. Nonetheless, the results of this study serve an important
purpose. Assumptions of rationality and optimality are an
important tool in understanding adaptive behaviour. These
assumptions, when posited (19, 20), should be followed to
their logical conclusion. Otherwise, it is impossible to deter-
mine, by comparing predictions and empirical data, whether
or not observed behaviour supports them. Precisely because
departures from rationality are of such profound interest to
biologists, economists and psychologists, it is important to be
precise in identifying what those departures are.
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